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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER WALLIS and MARLENE
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs- Respondents,
vs

H.E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL
FUND, INC., and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendants - Appellants,
Case No. 17051
WALTER WALLIS and MARLENE
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs - Respondents,
vs

H.E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL
FUND, INC., AMERICAN SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, and GLEN
JUSTICE MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC.
Defendants - Appellants,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

EXPI.ANATION-OF REFERENCE-TO RECORD
Plaintiffs commenced two almost identical lawsuits
(#233143 & 239555) which were then consolidated (R. A85-93;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R. B 54, 73).

In numbering the record the clerk commenced

with page #1 in each of the case files.

To avoid confusion

References (R.) to the file in case #233143 will be followed
by the letter "A" and to the file in case 11233555 will be
followed by the letter "B" to distinguish between the two
files.

(For example see reference above).

Reference to

the trial transcript are shown as "R" only.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Judgment for alleged violation of Utah Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act ("UTAH ACT") 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, erroniously held that "disposition" of four parcels from a 300
acre tract constituted the "disposition" of an "unregistered"
and "unexempt" "subdivision under the Utah Act.

A copy of

the Utah Act is furnished as appendix "I" for the convenience
of the Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was first tried by Judge Leary who dismissed
plaintiffs' claim Under the Utah Act, their claim for rescission and awarded judgment for alleged fraud (R. B 83, R.
88-90).

Judge Leary then vacated that judgment and offered

a new trial after determining that he had committed reversable
error (R. A 177, 184).

After a second trial Judge Taylor

dismissed the fraud claim without prejudice [but with prejudice if there was no appeal] (R. A 253), dismissed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rescision claim with prejudice and awarded judgment under
the Utah Act (R. A 234).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
An order holding that said 10 acres are not "subdivided
lands" within the meaning of the Utah Act; and/or that the
10 acres are "exempt" from the Utah Act and reversing plaintiffs' judgment under the Utah Act; or that failing, for
a new trial on plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Act; also
holding that dismissal of the fraud claim was with prejudice
and in res judicata.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts has been grouped under major
headings as follows:
1.

Alleged misrepresentations are not important to

decision Whether or not misrepresentations or omissions were made
concerning the 10 acres in Iron County exchanged to plaintiffs
is unimportant since defendants acknowledge that the Iron County
land was not registered as a subdivision (57-11-5, UCA, 1953)
and that no public offering statement was given to plaintiffs
(57-11-5 thru 57-11-10, UCA, 1953) and that under the Utah Act
either of those facts would be sufficient to support plaintiffs
judgment (57-11-17, UCA, 1953) if their 10 acres are "unexempt" (57-11-4, UCA, 1953) "subdivided" lands (57-11-2,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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UCA, 1953) within the meaning of the Utah Act, accordingly,
alleged misrepresentations are not important to the division herein.
2.

The primary controlling issue in this case is whether

the 10 acres exchanged to plaintiffs was part of a "subdivision"
within the meaning of the Utah Act.
If the 10 acres was not part of a "subdivision" within the
meaning of the Utah Act, (see discus si.cn on pages - - - - - beiow) or if exemptior.s in the act aprlied (see discussion on
pages _ _ _ _ _ _below) then
ment should he reversed.

the~

1 ower couri: P.rred and the judg-

It is unnecessary to discuss plaintiffs'

claim that defendant.s misrepresented the 10 acres.

However, so

that the Court mc:Ly more fully understand the controlling issues a brief summary of plaintiffs' allegions as to misrepresentatior
by defendants (which are all disputed)

is furnished as a part

of the statement of facts.
3.

Plaintiffs accepted the 10 acres in exchange for their

equity in a home that was about to be lost thru foreclosure Plaintiffs house was about to be sold at sheriff's sale
by the second trust deed holder because plaintiffs were about
six months in default in making payments on both first and
second trust deeds.
708).

(R. 557, 558, 560, 561, 590, 596, 688,

Plaintiffs' efforts to sell their house had been un-

successful (R. 558, 590, 591) and plaintiffs believed that
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a sheriffs sale of their house was scheduled two weeks
(R. 560-561).

Plaintiffs answered a newspaper advertisement

of defendant International Equities, Inc. ("IEI") offering
to purchase homes (R. 558,).

Plaintiffs and IEI entered

into handwritten exchange agreement (Ex. 14-P-see appendix II)
whereby IEI exchanged an unidentified said 10 acres in Iron
County (R. 707) for plaintiffs' home equity (R. 565, 566, 691).
That agreement was formalized by later typewritten agreement
containing some minor modifications (R. 569, 570, Ex. 2-P
and 30-D appendix III).
:1:

it

Plaintiffs deeded their house to

IEI (Ex. 3-P, appendix IV) in exchange IEI deeded the 10 acres
to plaintiffs (Ex. 9-P-appendix V), plaintiff's were trying to
salvage their credit rating to avoid a possible deficiency
judgment, and lose of other security for the loan, plaintiffs
attached little value to the land and felt that whatever they
got was better than a foreclosure (R. 708).
4.

Plaintiffs made no investigation concerning or ex-

amination of their 10 acres Plaintiff's were so unconcerned about the 10 acres that
they didn't even look at a map (R. 606) to locate the general
area where the property was located before signing the exchange agreement (appendix II) or before deeding their house
to IEI (appendix IV).

Plaintiffs did not inspect or visit

the 10 acres (R. 721) or make independent inquiry about the
property, its location, value, proximity to roads, utilities,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
surrounding
property,
etc. (R. 607-616, 708-710), except to
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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call an aunt who worked for the state Road Commission and
who made some general inquiry of other Road Commission employees. (R. 572, 573).
Plaintiffs did not determine whether the 10 acres was
in the valley or mountains (R. 703, 609), the direction
from Cedar City (R. 609), whether the 10 acres was west or
east of the freeway (R. 710, 615), or make inquiry of realtors
or others concerning the value of land in that area (R. 618).
Plaintiffs' gross inattention and negligence in exercising
care to protect their own interests are classic examples of
unjustified alleged reliance which the Utah Supreme Court has
said precludes recovery in fraud actions.

See Oberg v. Sanders,

111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229; Jardine v. Brunswick, 18 U. 2d 378,
423 P.2d 659; Lewis v. White, 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865;
Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 U. 52, 185 P.2d 264.

Plaintiffs'

unreasonable conduct, among other things, justifies dismissal
by the Court of plaintiffs' claims (R. A-253).
5.

Plaintiffs' unreasonably claim that they thought that

the 10 acres in Iron County was equal in value, type and quality
to the Bell Canyon Subdivision in Southeast Salt Lake County
(R. 723-727, 626-633).
Plaintiffs claim at the trial that they believed they
were getting improved lots in a subdivision complete with
roads, white rail fences and nearby utilities in an area with
growing crops which was allegedly near to Brian Head Ski Resort
(R. 698, 725,566).

Plaintiffs deed (appendix V) descrihed
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their 10 acres by metes and bounds plaintiffs located
the property generally on a map within a few days after
the exchange (R. 567-568, 571-572, 611, 615, 625-627, 694),
yet plaintiffs lived in the home which they had traded to
IEI for over a month after the exchange, then voluntarily
moved without complaint (R. 618).

They did not express

dissatisfaction with their bargain for approximately six months.
6.

IEI determined that plaintiffs had little or no equity

in the home and exchanged the 10 acres for whatever that equity
might be - (R. 790).
The IEI appraised plaintiffs' house and determined that
they had little if any equity over and above the first and
second mortgages (R. 769, 786 -789, 796, 802 - 805) and offered
to give them the 10 acres for whatever plaintiffs' equity in
their home might be (R. 790 - appendix III).

Thomas denies

that misrepresentations were made concerning the 10 acres in
Iron County.
7.

IEI made three other casual conveyances from the

300 acres in 7 years, two of which were tranfered to related corporations During January, 1975, (approximately 6 months preceding
the exchange with plaintiffs) IEI exchanged 5 acres from the
300 acre tract for some office furniture (Ex. 7-P, R.673,
680); in April, 1975,

(after IEI had losed its offices see

page #16 below) IEI transfered 5 acres (without consideration)
to a related corporation (R. 673, 678- 680 - Ex. 6-P)

and
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transferred some oil and gas rights (again without consideration) to another related corporation (R. 681, 679. Ex. 8-P).

No other transactions involving said 300 acre

tract occurred thru the time of trial (R. 661), which was
approximately 5 years after transaction with plaintiffs and
7 years after !EI bought the 300 acres.

No parcels were

advertised, offered for sale or sold to the public from that
300 acre tract (R. 686).

!EI has never subdivided property

or sold subdivision lots (R. 687).
As indicated above the only portions of the 300 acre
tract disposed of by !EI since its 1973 purchase were the 5
acres exchanged for office furniture, 10 acres exchanged for
plaintiffs' house equity and a 5 acre parcel and some oil and
gas rights transferred to related corporations (R. 686).
8.

!EI was not required to register under the Utah Act.

Since those transactions were not within the scope of the
Utah Act, and since !EI was not in and did not intend to engage in the business of subdividing selling or offering to
sell property to the public they were not required to and
did not register, furnished a public offering statement or
otherwise comply with the Utah Act, 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, et
seq. (R. 675-676).
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE 10 ACRES in IRON COUNTY is NOT A "SUBDIVISION" OR
"SUBDIVIDED LANDS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH ACT AND
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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WAS AN EXEMPT TRANSACTION.
9.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF UTAH ACT-

This action is based upon the Utah Uniform Land Sales
Practices Act ("UTAH ACT").

The Utah Act requires a sub-

division to file with a copy of the Utah Act is attached as
Appendix "I". (57-11-5 thru 57-11-10, UCA, 1953,) and to obtain the approval of the Department of Budiness Regulation of
a registration, public offering statement and to furnish other
information before "disposition" may be made of subdivided lands."
The Utah Act prohibits disposition of or offers to dispose of
"subdivided lands" in Utah until after the subdivided lands
are registered under the act (57-11-5(1), UCA, 1953), and
unless an effective (and comprehensive - 57-11-6 and 57-11
-7, UCA, 1953) current public offering statement is delivered
to the purchaser and a receipt for that offering statement
is obtained from him not less than 48 hours before he enters
into a contract dor the purchase of subdivided lands (57-115(2) and (3), UCA, 1953).

The statute allows injunctive re-

lief for threatened violations (57-11-11, UCA, 1953) imposes
severe criminal penalties (57-11-16, UCA, 1953) and give liberal
civil remedies to the buyer of noncomplying "subdivided lands,"
including the right to rescind his contract within 48 hours
after signing if the required offering statement is delivered
to him less than 48 hours before he signed (57-11-5(2), UCA,
1953), the right to recover the consideration paid with interest and attorney fees upon tender of reconveyance if the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seller fails to register the subdivision, fails to deliver
a current approved oublic offering statement, makes an untrue

statement of a material fact, omits to state a material fact
required to be included in the registeration statement or
in the offering statement or omits to state a material fact
which is necessary to make the statements made not misleading

(57-11-17, UCA, 1953).

The Utah Statute specifically refers

(57-11-2(9), 57-11-16(1), UCA, 1953, and elsewhere therein), to
a similar Federal Statute (Federal interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. §1701, et seq] and require uniformity of construction with decisions of other states which
have enacted similar uniform laws (57-11-21, UCA, 1953).

The

Utah Statute is a part of a national movement to regulate the
promotion and sale of subdivided land by speculatrs.

The

Utah Act not intended to regulate the sale of undeveloped land
which has not been and is not then intended to be "subdivided".

10.

Utah Act exempts subdivisions with less than 10

units, isolated transaction, dispositions of oil and gas interests, property acquired by builders, offers which are not
for gain or profit, etc.
The Federal statute as it then existed exempted subdivisions containing less than fifty (50) lots (15 U.S.C.S. §1701

(3) and §1702 (a)(l) [exemption has since been changed to
twenty-five (25) lots].

The Utah Statute defines a "sub-

division" as excluding property which has been or is proposed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be divided into less than 10 lots (57-11-2(6), UCA,
1953).

Other exemptions are included in the Utah Statute

for single or isolated transactions (57-ll-4(l)(a), UCA,
1953), for property containing certain building or where
seller has a contractural obligation to construct a building
within two years (57-ll-4(l)(b), UCA, 1953), where the property is acquired for use in the business of constructing
residential, commercial or industrial building (57-11-4(1)
(c), UCA, 1953), where the transaction involves dispositions
of an interest in oil, gas or minerals if those transactions
are regulated as securities (57-ll-4(2)(e), UCA 1953), offers
which are not for gain or profit (57-11-2(2), UCA, 1953, and
contains certain other exemptions.
11.

Plaintiffs failed to sustain burden of proving 10

acres were "subdivision" landBefore plaintiffs can recover under the Utah Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act, 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, et seq., they
must establish that the transaction wherein they acquired
the 10 acres of raw ground in Iron County was a transaction
covered by the Utah Act.

If that land was not a "subdivision"

or "Subdivided Lands" as defined by 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, then
the statute is simply not applicable and the judgment of
Judge Taylor should be vacated and set aside.
12.

Construction by Federal Court of similar statute

limits imposition of liability to those who meet definitions
under statute -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~· ~2~thampton

National Bank, (CA 3rd, 1978)

584 F2d 1288 the U.S. Court of Appeals considered a claim
under the Interstate Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §1701 (4)
(a similar federal statute) against a bank that had finance
contracts for subdivision lots.

It was claimed that the bank

was an "indirect seller" or "developer" within the meaning of
§1703 the act (lSUSES §1703).

Similar provisions concerning

indirect control of a subdivider as found in the Utah Act, 5711-17 (c)(e), UCA, 1953.
The Court quoted with approval from the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Ernst v. Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 96 S.
Ct. 1375, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976) and Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 44 L.
Ed 2d 539, decision (at Page 1293) as follows:
"Initially . . . the starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language
itself" . . . "The Act clearly limits the imposition
of liability to those who meet the definitions of
developers or agents of developers. Developers are
those who directly or indirectly engage in selling
efforts. Thus, since the Act provides for liability
for misstatements or omissions in the statutorily
required Statement of Record and Property Report or
in statements made to offeres of lots in a subdivision
logically the statute should be interpreted to include
within its scope only those engaged in the selling effort
In Pa uin v. Four Seasons of Tennessee, Inc. 517 F. 2d 1105
5th Cir. 1975), t e court stated. We think that the
language of [§1709 of the Act] indicates that Congress
intended the developer to be liable for its own acts and
those of its agents, which is the usual rule, but it did
not mean to scoop up every guide or salesman . . . and
make them a unless the , too, have the authorit """"tO
sell and to do
emphasis added
The Court then went on to reason that the bank was not
an indirect seller within the meaning of the act, as follows:
" . . . the reference to 'indirect sellers' in the
Act as defining who may be considere~ developers,
can only be constituted as encompassing those who
conduct their sellin efforts throu h means other
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the language or in the legislative history of the
Act that an indirect seller is other than one who is
involved in some manner in the selling efforts related
to a land development project." (emphasis added).
13.

Legislature did not mean to "scoop up" sellers of

unsubdivided landsIn a like manner we must look to the language of the
Utah Act and avoid a construction which would "scoop up" all
persons who sell unimproved land which has not been "subdivided" and who at the time of the transaction, do not "propose" to "subdivide" their land within the meaning of the
Utah Act.

The statute was intended to prohibit and punish

fraud in land subdivision development enterprises involving
a substantial number of lots [limited under the Utah Act to
at least la lots]

and should be flexibly construed to effect

its remedial purposes.

See Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, 380

A. 2d 1361 (Delaware) at P. 1364, and Mccown v. Heidler (10th
Cir. 1975) 527 F. 2d 204.

The Utah Statute (57-11-2(6) UCA,

1953) defines a "subdivision" and"subdivided lands" for the
purpose of that act as:
land which is"divided" or is "proposed to be divided
for the prupose of disposition into ten or more units"
are offered as part of a common promotional plan of
advertising and sale." (emphasis added). [see appendix I]
14.

Plaintiffs' 10 acres is not part of a "subdivision"

or "proposed subdivision" so Utah Act does not apply.
It is undisputed that the land was not "subdivided"
(P.675-676).

There is no evidence in the record which would

tend to support a claim that defendants have at any time offered
"~,.......... Sponsored
"',.. T"nn,.-o nnir~"for sale, or that any of the parcels were
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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conveyed . . . as part of a connnon promotional plan of
advertising and sale within the meaning of (57-11-2(6),
UCA, 1953) since there is no evidence in the record
from which the Court could conclude that defendants
"proposed to . . . divide" their land "for the purpose of
distribution into ten or more units," plaintiffs' 10 acres
are simply not part of a "subdividison" within the statutory
definitions (57-11-2(6)), UCA, 1953), the statute is inapplicable and the judgment should be vacated.
15.

Record contains no evidence of intent or "proposal"

to "subdivide"Counsel for plaintiff argued at the trial (R. 852-853)
that said four conveyances of land from the 300 acre that
over a period of seven months was evidence that defendants
"proposed" to "divide" said land into ten or more parcels for
"purposes of disposition."

It is difficult to understand

how the four unrelated dispositions proves that IEI intended
to convey additional parcels.

That argument illustrates

the weakness of plaintiffs' case and the absence of any
evidence to support a claim that defendants were "subdividers"
within the meaning of 57-11-2(5), UCA, 1953, or that defendant's
land is a "subdivision" within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA,
1953.

There was no evidence of any "connnon promotional plan"

involved in those conveyances, each being different in type
and kind, with only two having been made to other than related
corporations (R. 673, 678-681), to-wit: the conveyance to
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plaintiffs and the conveyance to a f··---= '""··-- _____ , -

exchange for furniture (R. 673,680).

The conveyance to

related corporations (R. 673, 678-681, Ex 6-P & 8-P) were
not "dispositions" for "gain or profit" as required by 5711-2 (l), UCA, 1953, since they were made without consideration
(R. 679-680), and are expressly excluded from the scope of
the Utah Act.

There was no evidence of defendant advertising

the property for sale (R 686).

There is no evidence in the

record which would tend to indicate that at the time of their
exchange of the 10 acres to plaintiffs the defendants intended to dispose of any additional parcels of property
from the 300 acre tract.

To the contrary, the undisputed

evidence shows that defendants intended to hold and have held
the property for investment (R. 683).
16.

Abandoned prior investigation into possibility of

subdividing does not convert investment land into a "subdivision" or "proposed subdivision"When defendant purchased the property in 1973 it investigated the feasibility of subdividing the property and
selling recreational lots with dirt roads and without utilities (R. 781, 782, 820).

IEI then had an employee who

had prior experience with another employee in subdividing
and selling such property (R. 781-782) who in connection with
his feasibility investigation employed an engineer who drew
a preliminary subdivision plat (R. 683, 782-782, 806) and
for an attorney to investigate possible registeration of the
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About February, 1974, after that preliminary investigation,
IEI determined that there was too much red tape involved
(R. 686, 782), that the timing was not right (R. 790) and
abandoned the project, cancelled the office lease, closed
the business office, sold the furniture, (R. 686) discharged
the employees (including the employee with experience in subdividing) discontinued that proposed business, move the remaining typewriter and desk to Mr. Thomas' home, and decided
to hold the land for investment purposes (R. 781-783).
From the date of purchase in 1973 until abandoment of the
project in February, 1974, it might have been agreed that the
300 acres "land which is . . . proposed to be divided for the
purpose of disposition into ten or more units" within the
meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953.

Had the sale to plaintiffs

occurred during that period it might have been a sale within
the scope of the act.

However the undisputed evidence showed

that the investigation of the possibility of subdividing was
abandoned before it reached the status of a proposed offering
and long before it reached the state of actually subdividing,
selling lots or offering lots for sale the term "proposed"
refers to existing proposals or plans and not to past abandoned
plans or projects.

Once investigation of a potential project

subdividing the 300 acre tract was abandoned (in February, 1974)
it was no longer a "proposed" subdivision (assuming but not
agreeing that it would qualify as a "proposed subdivision"
during that period ) but was simply an investment.

The dis-
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position of small parcels in a casual manner from land held
as an investment is not regulated by either the Federal or
Utah Acts.

Once investigation concerning the possible sub-

division project was abandoned it was no more a "proposed"
project than had no such subdividing investigation ever been
made.
17.

Meaning of "proposed to be divided" -

As indicated above, it is undisputed that IEI did not
"subdivide" its property.

Unless it "proposed" to "divide"

its land within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, the 10
acres is not a "subdivision" within the meaning of 57-11-2(6),
UCA, 1953, and the statute does not apply to plaintiffs.

Black's

Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition and cases there cited
define "Propose" as "an offer; something proffered," and as
"signification by one person to another of his willingness to
enter into a contract on the terms specified in the offer."

By

adding the letters "ed" to propose we convert it into the past
tense "proposed" which signifies that a specific determination
has in fact been made to (sub)divide the land.

The balance of

the phrase "for the purpose of disposition into ten or more
units" further qualifies the meaning to require a continuation
of a prior decision (there had been no such decision) to divide
the property into 10 or more units for the purpose of disposition.
Accordingly, if there had been a decision to subdivide for purposes of disposition into 10 or more units (which there was not)
once those plans are abandoned there is no longer a "proposed"
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18.

Other exemptions available to IEI -

Even if the 10 acres had been part of an actual or
proposed subdivision (which it was not as demonstrated above),
still plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover against defendants because of specific exemptions in the statute, including
the following:
(a)

The two conveyances to related corporations were

not "for gain or profit" within the meaning of the exemption
from the Utah Acted in 57-11-2(2), UCA, 1953, (R. 686).
(b)

The transaction with plaintiffs was a "single or isolated

transaction" for the plaintiffs "own account" within the
meaning of the exemption from the Utah Act in 57-ll-4(l)(a),
UCA, 1953.
(c)

Plaintiffs testified that they acquired the property

for purposes of constructing homes as a business (R. 625, 841,
which is a transaction which is specifically exempt from the
Utah Act as provided in 57-ll-4(l)(c), UCA, 1953.
(d)

The disposition of oil and gas interests (Ex. 8-P,

R. 681) [to a related corporation as mentioned above] is exempt from the Utah Act as provided in 57-ll-4(e), UCA, 1953.
Exempt transactions cannot be used to prove violation of or
intent to violate the Utah Act since the "division" or "proposal
to divide" would necessarily require subdividing in non-exempt
transactions.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FRAUD CLAIMS "WITHOUT
PREJUDICE" IN THE EVENT THAT DEFENDANTS APPEALED.
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After trial where plaintiffs' fraud claims were fully
litigated the Court first dismissed the fraud count (second
claim for relief - RA 7-9) without prejudice (R. A 222,
234) and later amended the judgment of dismissal to provide
(R. A 254, ,5) as follows:
" . . . Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action is hereby
dismissed with prejudice if no appeal is taken from
this judgment, and dismissed without prejudice if an
appeal is taken from this judgment."
In Matthews v. Matthews,

102 U. 428, 132 P.2d 111 The Court

stated the reason for the res judicata rule as follows:
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of
"res judicata" rests is that parties ought not to be
ermitted to liti ate the same issue more than once,
an , that when a right or fact has been ju icial y
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them.
(emphasis added)
To dismiss a claim "without prejudice" after a trial
flies in the teeth of the principal of res judicata and is
beyond the power of the Court.
case or they did not.
must be with prejudice.

Either plaintiffs proved their

If it is to be dismissed the dismissal
To attempt to prevent defendants from

taking an appeal by this type of conditional judgment is contrary to the letter and spirit of Art. VIII, §9 of the Utah
Constitution which gives a right of appeal to the Supreme

l

Court from all final judgments of the District Court.

Under

the judgment as rendered it would not become final until the
time for appeal had expired.

The judgment of the District

Court should be amended to provide that the dismissal of the
second cause of action (fraud count) is with prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
The 300 acre tract owned by IEI was not "subdivided" nor
"proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into
ten or more units" [only 4 parcels were conveyed] and the 10
acres acquired by plaintiffs was not "offered as a part of a
common promotional plan of advertising and sale" within the
meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, and accordingly was not
"subdivided lands" which was covered by the Utah Act.

Had

IEI's land been covered by the act (which it was not) the
transaction involved in this lawsuit would have been exempt as
an "isolated transaction", since two of the three other conveyances were transferd to related corporations which were
"not for gain or profit" within the meaning of 57-11-2(2),
UCA, 1953, and one of those conveyances was of gas and oil
rights which was also exempt under 57-ll-4(2)(e), UCA, 1953.
The only other transaction was an unrelated exchange of 5 acres
for furniture which was remote in time.
The Utah Act simply does not apply under the facts which
required that the judgment be vacated and set aside.
The Court's attempt to dismiss the second claim "without
prejudice" after trial is in error.

The Court should correct
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the dismissal to state that it was with prejudice.

DATED this 28th day of August, 1980.

Respectfully submitted.
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LD • B
R
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the
foregoing to Wayne G. Petty, Attorney for Respondants - Plaintiffs, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 28th
day of August, 1980.
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